This book is a history of American “foreign assistance,” to use, as the author does, the old-fashioned term. The theme of the book is that, far from eliciting responsible behavior and achieving positive results in recipient countries, US assistance has, not infrequently and with sometimes horrific impact, facilitated state violence; its victims being collateral damage of US foreign policy. The introduction provides an excellent fast-forward tour d'horizon of American assistance from Truman and the origins of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), through the Cold War and decline of communism, through the post-9/11 war on terrorism, bringing us to the present. It embeds assistance in the broader, evolving policy goals of each US administration; a rope of intertwined altruism and self-interest passed from one to the next. There have been outbreaks of virtue; there have been convulsions of cynicism, but none has threatened to break the rope. A theory is proposed (Chapter 1) based on the proposition that among aid's effects, regardless of its intended purpose, is to increase recipient governments’ capacity to coerce their political opposition and the citizenry in general—money is fungible; fiscal constraints are loosened. No one is going to put up a statue to the author for this insight, but it provides a reasonably solid foundation for what follows. Empirical trends in foreign aid and state violence are presented in Chapter 2. The remainder of the book consists of well-researched and interesting case studies of US foreign assistance to Indonesia, El Salvador, and South Korea and the abuses it enabled. A brief chapter near the end brings the story up to date for the current century, with a special focus on the sad story of South Sudan. In conclusion, the author convincingly argues that American aid policy never took seriously the fundamental rule Primum, nolo nocere—“First, do no harm.” Right, but again, no statue; the dark side of aid has been known for years, at least by economists. It distorts labor markets, sends the price of nontradables soaring, balloons the money supply, and so on. Such harmful economic consequences may not be written in blood, but they are written in dollars and cents that have their human consequences nonetheless. The author's standard is also questionable. The nolo nocere rule is fundamental in humanitarian relief, but that is only a small corner of the global development project; in fact, the humanitarian relief and development communities think very differently. An analytical angle not well-developed is the fact that foreign assistance is embedded in incentive structures at all levels, from the village civil society organization in the South looking for survival to mightiest Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the North looking for entry points and leverage. Surprising, also not much thematized is the fact that, in this Age of Jihad, development and security policies (the latter encompassing both external and internal) have blended. The military and law enforcement establishments have become enthusiastic supporters of development assistance—former US Defense Secretary James Mattis apocryphally remarked “The less aid you send, the more bullets I have to buy.” Finally, and at the highest geostrategic level, US and Western foreign assistance has to be considered as a counter to China's emergence as a country-buyer and Russia's as a state provider of guns-for-hire. The author asks, in closing, whether a nolo nocere foreign assistance policy is possible. Probably not on her terms, because what she is really objecting to in this book is not foreign assistance per se; it is the harmful and ill-conceived US foreign policies to which it has been (and is) handmaiden. Channeling more aid through NGOs, rather than governments, she recognizes, is a nonstarter—they cannot move the sums required; in addition to which, it could be added, they are not without legitimacy issues of their own. Anyone who constructs with any common sense the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation that emerged in 2012 from the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness at Busan—for nonplayers, the high-level commitments under which the Sustainable Development Goals or SDGs are pursued—knows that the aid game is played government-to-government with respect for civil society that is due, but not an iota more. Better monitoring and evaluation (M&E), the author suggests, is called for, as is taking financial sustainability more seriously at design stage; those are sound points. But one finishes the book convinced that foreign assistance as currently practiced, like little Sir John Barleycorn in the old song, will prove, despite efforts to suppress, reform, or sanitize him, the strongest man at last. The money has got to flow, and as long as it does, it is likely to sometimes give rise to the mischief this book effectively documents. As to style, the reader could not ask for a more informative, brisker policy history read. The only jarring note is the preface, which needed wise editorship at Stanford University Press—in a work of scholarship, authorial identity-speak and outrage are best indulged in seldom and in doses so small as to border on the homeopathic. A sentence or two would have done.